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We investigate the role of economic transparency within the framework of one of
Townsend’s models of ‘forecasting the forecasts of others’. The equilibrium has the
property that ‘higher order beliefs’ are coordinated into a ﬁnite-dimensional setup that
is amenable to address monetary policy issues. We focus here on the role of public
information about the money supply, and ﬁnd that it should be fully revealing.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, E58
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March 2005Non-Technical Summary
Central bank transparency has been a key issue under discussion with the move
toward greater central bank independence. The most strikingly simple example of
how too much transparency can be costly is if a central bank is willing to release
all its information about a supply shock. It is then unable optimally to aﬀect
employment, because the unexpected component of inﬂation is zero, so there can be
no trade-oﬀ of the eﬀects of the shock between inﬂation and unemployment. Only
if it restricts this information, can it react in a manner that is beneﬁcial to society.
Debate on transparency has been fostered by the accompanying requirement of
greater accountability in order to justify greater independence. Thus the evaluation
of the performance of central banks can only be achieved by an improvement in
accountability. This takes the general form of an increase in communication with
the public, coupled with the acceptance of repercussions from any disasters, such as
the dismissal of bank oﬃcials. Such accountability is associated with the notion of
transparency, of which there are ﬁve aspects: political, economic, procedural, policy
and operational. This paper is concerned directly with just one of these, namely
economic transparency, and focuses on the information that is used for monetary
policy.
Since ”accountability directly aﬀects the central bank’s incentives, whereas in-
centive eﬀects of transparency only operate indirectly through private sector ex-
pectations”, it follows that some form of transparency is essential. With central
banks only controlling the overnight rate, there needs to be some other mechanism
by which monetary policy can coordinate expectations. The motivation for central
banks not being fully transparent is then twofold. Firstly, there is the potential
for market participants to be unduly inﬂuenced by a central bank judgement that
may be misguided. This is hardly a new insight, and central banks have in the past
developed their own coping mechanisms for announcements and dealings with the
press. Secondly, there is a trade-oﬀ between early publication of data and the dis-
covery of subsequent error, and the consequent loss of reputation due to the latter
is likely to be the main factor in deciding not to be fully transparent.
A number of recent papers have moved away from the more conventional ap-
proach to economic transparency, which involves a single representative private
agent. The standard literature comes up with results about whether social welfare
is enhanced or not as a consequence of having greater information, and is addressed
analytically by the choice of an optimal level of the noise to signal ratio. The more
recent literature addresses the same questions within a framework where there are
private agents with diverse information sets, and is largely based on the island model
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ing decisions are made on the basis of private information on the money supply and
expectations of the current aggregate price index, which is a weighted sum of all
current pricing decisions. For the most basic model that it may not be optimal (in
welfare terms) for public information to be fully revealing.
One of the major problems with the above model are the informational assump-
tions, notably that the consumer price index is not known, but must be inferred. It
is essential therefore to investigate the case of heterogeneous agents within a more
realistic informational framework. Fortunately, in some recent work, a particular
example of the ’forecasting the forecasts of others’ problem has been solved. Un-
derlying this is an intertemporal proﬁt maximization problem for ﬁrms, in which all
prices are observed but only one’s own current output can be measured. There is
a common demand shock, here interpreted as due to the money supply following a
stochastic process, coupled with idiosyncratic demand shocks as well. In this paper
we add an additional noisy public information signal about the current value of the
money supply. Thus agents must disentangle their own information from inferences
about other agents’ information. Once the solution has been described, we are able
to obtain a value for the expected welfare gain for ﬁrms. Of course this is insuﬃ-
cient for calculating a measure of social welfare, so we add this to our discussion,
and couple it with the assumption that the variance of prices is important as well.
All the welfare eﬀects, whether associated with ﬁrms, consumers or price stability,
lead to the conclusion that public information should be fully revealing with regard
to aggregate demand (money supply) shocks.
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Central bank transparency has been a key issue under discussion with the move toward
greater central bank independence. Cukierman (2001) and Geraats (2002) have sum-
marised the main theoretical points using a simple Barro-Gordon framework, with varying
informational assumptions. The most strikingly simple example of how too much trans-
parency can be costly is aﬀorded by Cukierman (2001), who shows that when a central
bank is willing to release all its information about a shock, it is unable optimally to aﬀect
employment, because the unexpected component of inﬂation is zero. Only if it restricts
this information, can it react in a manner that is beneﬁcial to society.
Debate on transparency has been fostered by the accompanying requirement of greater
accountability in order to justify greater independence. Thus the evaluation of the perfor-
mance of central banks can only be achieved by an improvement in accountability. This
takes the general form of an increase in communication with the public, coupled with
the acceptance of repercussions from any disasters, such as the dismissal of bank oﬃcials.
Such accountability, while associated with, does not of course come under, the aegis of
transparency for which Geraats (2002) distinguishes ﬁve aspects: political, economic, pro-
cedural, policy and operational. This paper is concerned directly with just one of these,
namely economic transparency, and focuses on the information that is used for monetary
policy. Svensson and Woodford (2003) is a good example of political transparency, with
its emphasis on inﬂation targeting, with Walsh (2001) covering contracts and Schaling
and Nolan (2001) addressing (a somewhat primitive form of) preference uncertainty. Op-
erational transparency has been discussed by Faust and Svensson (2001), and involves
the degree to which the imperfectness of control (i.e. the control error) over inﬂation is
revealed. Their additional focus on the indirect observability of central bank’s preferences
and objectives has its roots in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Procedural transparency
centres around individual voting records, and minutes of monetary policy committee meet-
ings. Policy transparency is the disclosure of policy decisions and of likely future policy;
testing for market eﬀects of associated policy statements is in its infancy.
Geraats (2002) makes the point that ”accountability directly aﬀects the central bank’s
incentives, whereas incentive eﬀects of transparency only operate indirectly through pri-
vate sector expectations”. Some form of transparency is therefore essential, for as Blinder
(1998) argues, with central banks only controlling the overnight rate, there needs to be
some other mechanism by which monetary policy can coordinate expectations. The mo-
tivation for central banks not being fully transparent is then twofold. Firstly, there is the
potential for market participants to be unduly inﬂuenced by a central bank judgement
that may (hopefully no more than occasionally) be misguided (Amato et al. (2003)). This
is hardly a new insight, and central banks have in the past developed their own coping
mechanisms for announcements and dealings with the press. Secondly, there is a trade-oﬀ
7
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quent loss of reputation due to the latter is likely to be the main factor in deciding not to
be fully transparent.
A number of recent papers have moved away from the more conventional approach to
economic transparency, which involves a single representative private agent. The standard
literature comes up with results about whether social welfare is enhanced or not as a
consequence of having greater information, and is addressed analytically by the choice of
an optimal level of the noise to signal ratio. The more recent literature addresses the same
questions within a framework where there are private agents with diverse information
sets, and is largely based on the island model of Lucas, but with imperfectly competitive
markets. Woodford (2001) is the pioneer of this new literature, although his initial work
was intended to produce long drawn out business cycle eﬀects. The idea behind his model
is that individual pricing decisions are made on the basis of private information on the
money supply (where the quantity theory of money with constant velocity always applies)
and expectations of the current aggregate price index. The latter is a weighted sum of
all current pricing decisions, which leads to an inﬁnite set of iterated expectations, all
dependent on the underlying stochastic process for the money supply; Woodford (2001)
neatly shows that the reduced form solution can be expressed in ﬁnite form. Amato et al.
(2003), Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (2002) use this model as a workhorse to
investigate the eﬀects of an additional source of public information, and ﬁnd for the most
basic model that it may not be optimal (in welfare terms) for public information to be
fully revealing. In addition, Hellwig (2002) also examines this model in an optimal policy
context, but ﬁnds that public announcements should always be fully revealing.
One of the major problems however with the model are the informational assumptions.
As Svensson (2001) points out, it would be an unusual private agent who would not have
good information on the consumer price index, so it is essential to investigate the case
of heterogeneous agents within a more realistic informational framework. Fortunately,
in some recent work, Pearlman and Sargent (2003) have solved a particular example of
the ’forecasting the forecasts of others’ problem posed by Townsend (1983). Underlying
this is an intertemporal proﬁt maximization problem for ﬁrms, in which all prices are
observed but only one’s own current output can be measured. There is a common demand
shock, here interpreted as due to the money supply following a stochastic process, coupled
with idiosyncratic demand shocks as well. In this paper we add an additional noisy
public information signal about the current value of the money supply. Thus agents must
disentangle their own information from inferences about other agents’ information. Once
the solution has been described, we are able to obtain a value for the expected welfare
gain for ﬁrms. Of course this is insuﬃcient for calculating a measure of social welfare,
so we add this to our discussion, and couple it with the assumption that the variance of
prices is important as well.
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drawing on the exact solution from Pearlman and Sargent (2003). Section 3 discusses the
welfare gains and losses, and highlights the crucial issues for public information in this
setup. Section 4 compares our results with those from analyses with a single representative
agent based on the Barro-Gordon model, and those in the more recent work cited above.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section describes Townsend’s basic model of an industry, then solves it under certain
assumptions about what decision makers observe. Firms in each of two industries i = 1;2
employ a single factor of production capital, ki
t, to produce output of a single good, yi
t. We
let capital letters denote market wide objects and lower case letters denote objects chosen
by a representative ﬁrm. A representative ﬁrm in industry i has production function
yi
t = fki
t, where henceforth we normalize so that f = 1; it acts as a price taker with












; h > 0: (1)
Demand in industry i obeys
Pi
t = ¡bY i
t + µt + ²i
t; b > 0; (2)
where Y i
t = Ki
t is total output in market i, µt is the persistent component of a demand
shock that is common across the two industries and which we shall interpret as a money
supply shock, and ²i
t is an industry speciﬁc component of the demand shock that is i.i.d.
with variance ¾2
². We assume that µt satisﬁes
µt+1 = ½µt + vt+1 (3)
where fvt+1g is an i.i.d. sequence of Gaussian shocks with mean zero and variance ¾2
v.
Following on from Blinder (1998) and, for example Gerlach (2003), who suggests that the
ECB’s two pillars have the consequence that the link between M3 growth and interest
rates is not strong, it is reasonable to assume that ¾2
v > 0. To simplify notation, we set
h = 1. In equilibrium, ki
t = Ki
t, but as usual we must distinguish between ki
t and Ki
t when
we pose the ﬁrm’s optimization problem.
The ﬁrst term in (1) is revenue, while the second term represents adjustment costs.
Since we focus on deviations from equilibrium, we have omitted a (constant) cost of capital
term, as it merely introduces a constant term into the solution.




where (P¡i)t is the history of prices in the other market up to and including time t.
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t in its
own industry, as well as the price, it can infer the total demand shock µt + ²i
t. However,
at time t, the ﬁrm sees only P¡i
t and does not see Y ¡i
t , so that ﬁrm i does not appear to
see µt + ²¡i
t
In addition we assume that there is a further noisy public signal on monetary aggregates
provided by the central bank µt + wt, where fwtg is an i.i.d. sequence of Gaussian shocks
with mean zero and variance ¾2
w. This can be regarded as a signal which is a summary of
press statements, publications and announcements by bank oﬃcials.
A remarkable result due to Kasa (2000) is that in the end, the ﬁrm in industry i will
be able to infer the composite shock µt + ²¡i
t from the data that it does observe at t. In
a later development, Pearlman and Sargent (2003) showed how fully to characterize the
solution. We shall not repeat the steps in the solution procedure, but will brieﬂy work
through the logic after presenting the full solution.
Firstly, standard ﬁrst-order conditions for (1) yield a relationship between ki
t, its lagged
value and anticipated future values of itself and of µt and "i
t. Secondly, assume that all
information is pooled; using the partial information results of Pearlman et al. (1986) one

































































wt] + vt; (5)
the Riccati equation for the innovations process for µt, e µt = µt ¡ Et¡1µt satisﬁes
p =
½2p







and ¸ is the larger root of the
(¸ ¡ 1)(¸ ¡ 1=¯) = b¸; (7)
and corresponds to the eigenvalue associated with the saddlepath of the optimal solution.
Proof See Appendix for an outline of this.
Note that the smaller root is then given by 1=¯¸, and it is straightforward to show
that this is less than 1. The equations above are slightly diﬀerent from those in Pearlman
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and then to work through the partial information solution for industry 2, assuming that
the information available is both sets of prices, the public signal, and industry 2’s capital
stock. When this is done, one obtains an identical process for k2
t to that in (4), and the
same representation of the innovations process. Once again, we note that the algebra is
slightly more tedious than in Pearlman and Sargent (2003) because of the presence of
the public signal. The bottom line therefore is that the solution with pooled information
is identical to that where the information sets are diverse and unpooled; incorporating
one another’s expectations does not in this case lead to an inﬁnite regress as Townsend
expected, but to a much simpler inference problem in equilibrium.
Before closing this section, we summarize the covariance properties of the system,









(1 ¡ ½2)p ¡ ¾2
v






v ¡ (1 ¡ ½2)p








w on the variance of
ki. If there is no precision at all in the measurement of µ i.e. the variances of ¾2
" and
¾2
w are inﬁnite, then p = ¾2
v=(1 ¡ ½2), so that the var(ki)=0. The reason for this is that
the conditional value of µt will now be 0 for all t, and the optimal strategy for ﬁrms will
therefore be independent of any the stochastic eﬀects. As the precision of w increases i.e.
as its variance decreases, the value of p decreases, and var(ki) increases. The latter reaches
its maximum when ¾2
w = 0, at which point p = ¾2
v. Of course, if there is no precision in
the public signal, but ¾2




3 The eﬀect of public information on welfare
In this section we take a rather narrow view of welfare. However, rather than specify
a particular social welfare function, we examine the components that we may regard as
making up welfare, and examine the eﬀects that improved public information may have
on each. We consider three components: ﬁrst, the proﬁt of ﬁrms, as described in the
previous section. Second is consumer surplus; the demand function (2) will lead to a
consumer surplus which is the expected value of bY 2
i for each sector i. Note that a more
careful analysis of consumer welfare based on an underlying utility function would lead
to a quadratic form in each type of output, but standard convexity assumptions on the
utility function, and the equivalence of output in each sector would still lead to consumer
11
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welfare can be written as a positive function of var(ki). Finally, we shall assume that a
further welfare component is the loss from price variation i.e. a loss proportional to sum
of var(Pi).
In order to calculate the ﬁrst of these components, it is suﬃcient to obtain the long


















= ¡bvar(k) + cov(µ;k) ¡ var(k) + cov(ki
t+1;ki
t)







Noting that from (7) we can write 1
¯¸ ¡ 1 ¡ b = ¡¸(1 ¡ 1
¯¸), it follows that after further
eﬀort we can write
Wfirm =
¸(1 ¡ ½)(¾2
v ¡ (1 ¡ ½2)p)




It follows that if this is to made as large as possible, then p must be made as small as
possible. Thus the precision, as deﬁned earlier, needs to be as large as possible, so that
the noise in the public signal should be equal to zero.
Consider now the welfare of consumers. As discussed above, this is a positive function
of the variance of the capital stock, given by (10). If the aim were solely to maximize
consumer surplus, then it would be necessary to set the value of p to be as small as possible,
thereby maximizing the variance of capital stock. Once again, the optimum policy on the
part of the policymaker would be to maximize the value of public information by setting
¾2
w = 0.
Finally we consider the loss from price volatility. The variance of prices in the ith
industry is given by
E(Pi
t)2 = E(¡bki





1 ¡ ½2 + ¾2
" ¡ 2bcov(µ;k)





1 ¡ ½2 + ¾2
" ¡
b¯¸[¸(1 + ¯)(1 ¡ ½) + (¸ ¡ ½)(1 + ¯¸)]
(¯¸ + 1)(¯¸ ¡ ½)(½ ¡ ¸)2(1 ¡ ½2)
(¾2
v ¡ (1 ¡ ½2)p) (14)
To minimize this loss, it is clear that p needs to be set as low as possible, which means
that the noise in the public signal must be set to zero. We therefore arrive at the following
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taminated by noise.
(b) The monetary authority should be as revealing as possible about its own informa-
tion, even if that information is not as full as it may desire.
Proof (a) follows from the results above. (b) is true since it can be shown from (6)
that p is always increasing in ¾2
w.
The intuition behind the result of Proposition 2(a) relies completely on Proposition
1. Given that the equilibrium dynamics correspond to all information being pooled, ad-
ditional public information leads to greater accuracy in estimating the shocks µt. This
increase in accuracy does not guarantee that the value of the objective function for a
forward-looking system will improve - in fact, the results on this are equivocal. How-
ever there is a formal equivalence between the model studied here and another, which is a
backward-looking one. The model of (1) and (2) assumes that individual ﬁrms within each
industry take prices as given by (2), but do not choose the price strategically. Straight-
forward algebra shows that exactly the same solution (4) is obtained if the industry acts
strategically to solve a standard optimal control problem of the form (1), but with the
demand equation given by Pi
t = ¡b
2ki
t + µt + ²i
t. But the value function of a standard
(linear-quadratic) optimal control problem increases with increased accuracy of the ob-
servations, hence the value to ﬁrms of increased transparency. The welfare beneﬁt to
consumers of increasing the variance of the capital stock by increasing public information
is evident from the earlier discussion in this section. As regards price volatility, on the one
hand increased information raises the variance of the capital stock; but on the other hand
it increases the correlation between the capital stock and the monetary shock because the
former can now react more accurately to the latter. Since the latter eﬀect dominates, price
volatility declines with increased information.
4 Comparison with other economic transparency results
Not all aspects of economic transparency address identical issues. An example of a diﬀerent
aspect that provides the starkest eﬀect of economic transparency emerges in a one-shot
game in the context of a Barro-Gordon model. It applies whether or not the central bank
lacks reputation and must act in a time-consistent manner. Then, no matter whether it is
able to reveal the full extent of the supply shock or else to provide its own private noisy
signal, the optimum policy is to give itself scope to respond to this signal (Cukierman
(2001)). Otherwise it is unable to spring any surprise beneﬁcial countercyclical policy.
For an alternative model, with an IS curve, and an output gap eﬀect on next period’s
inﬂation, social welfare is only reduced by forecasts of shocks if the policymaker cares about
interest rate variability. However, these results may be overturned if there is uncertainty
about the policymaker’s targets (operational transparency); there is an incentive eﬀect of
13
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result is that the homogeneous agent literature is somewhat equivocal about the beneﬁts
of economic transparency.
Directly related to our results are those which stem from the imperfect common knowl-
edge model of Woodford (2001), which is based on the assumption of imperfect competition
between ﬁrms. A more conventional approach to deriving the same model is provided by
Amato et al. (2003) who assume that there are supply and demand functions for good i
given by
Y iS = c(Pi ¡ Ei(P)) Y iD = Ei(µ) ¡ Pi (15)
where P is the average of all prices Pi over the inﬁnite set of goods, and Ei denotes
expectations by the producer of good i based on an information set comprising both
public y, and private xi, observations of µ:
y = µ + w xi = µ + "i (16)
These represent the only measurements made by agents, so that analysis of the model
is achieved by focusing on the price of each good. Assuming market clearing, one obtains
Pi = (1 ¡ r)Ei(µ) + rEi(P) r = b=(b + 1) (17)
Money supply µ is unknown, and must be inferred from the above measurements. It is
then relatively easy to derive the equilibrium prices of each ﬁrm, even though in principle,
it appears (as in the model of Section 2) that an inﬁnite regress of expectations is required.
It can be shown that these prices are linearly dependent on the two measurements. They
turn out to be more heavily weighted towards the public signal y, and less to the private
signal xi than is each ﬁrms’ estimate of the money supply. Amato et al. (2003) then
show that if welfare is deﬁned by the variance of prices, increased precision of the private
signal always increases welfare. However, for given variance of the private signal, there is
a range of level of precision of the public signal over which an increase in that precision
level is welfare-reducing. This is due the higher weight of the public signal in prices,
compared to its weight on the estimate of the fundamental µ, so that there is a relative
over-reaction. Thus if the central bank is limited by its own measurements, there is a
range of values of precision for which it is optimum for the announcements of the central
bank to be more imprecise than its own information. Similar results are obtained if one
makes the assumption of Hellwig (2002) that the money supply is a draw of a normal
random variable.
Hellwig (2002) also uses this rudimentary form of the model of Woodford (2001) to
address the role of transparency and public information in an optimizing model. He
assumes that monetary policy is partly set by the policymaker, and is partly subject to
shocks, and is then observed along the lines outlined above. His results are not dissimilar
from those of Section 3, in that he ﬁnds no role for noisy public information, and that it
should be fully revealing.
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The purpose of this paper has been to add some more perspective to the role of economic
transparency. Using some recent results on optimizing models with heterogeneous agents
with diverse information, we have demonstrated the role that public information may take
for the purpose of increasing social welfare. All the welfare eﬀects, whether associated with
ﬁrms, consumers or price stability, lead to the conclusion that public information should
be fully revealing with regard to aggregate demand (money supply) shocks.
We have contrasted this with the conventional homogeneous agent literature, which de-
livers a mixed message on economic transparency, and the heterogeneous agent literature,
which comes down more ﬁrmly on some optimal level of precision of public information;
this optimal level may not coincide with the central bank’s private level of precision. The
problem with the latter literature, based on Woodford (2001), is that the informational
assumptions are not particularly realistic, especially compared with the model of this
paper.
A possible extension of the current model would be along the lines of Woodford (2001),
involving a large number of ﬁrms and a very general stochastic process for money supply.
Then each ﬁrm observes the average price and receives (presumably noisy) signals on
current average output. This, and the incorporation of optimal monetary policy into the
setup, are currently under investigation.
A Outline Proof of Proposition 1








where Et denotes expectations based on information at time t.
One can then rewrite the system in a standard form for forward-looking rational expectations
models as:
ki
t+1 = (1 + b)ki
t ¡ ²i
t ¡ µt + gi
t (A.2)








t + µt (A.5)
together with an additional publicly observed variable
mt = µt + wt (A.6)
To verify that Proposition 1 is correct, assume that it is true for industry 1. Then the system
for industry 2 is characterized by the dynamic equations (4), (5), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4), together
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the representation of (4) for industry 2 as well.
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